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SECURITIES

LAW-THE

STANDARD OF LIABILITY UNDER RULE

10b-5 IN CASES OF NONDISCLOSURE-Chiarella v. United States,
100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Vincent Chiarella worked for more than twenty years! for
Pandick Press, a specialized printing hous~ in Manhattan. 2 He rose
from the positions of linotype operator and copy cutter to become
a mark-up man earning over $22,000 per year. As a mark-up man,
Chiarella was the first person in the composing room to receive
confidential statements and fonus from customers in law firms,
banking houses,4 and corporations. 5 In addition to preparing mun
dane documents including annual reports and proxy statements,
Chiarella also regularly received drafts of Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) fonus requiring public disclosure of tender of
fers.6
The premium offered by the tender offeror has the effect of
raising the market price of the target company's stock once the ten
der offer is announced because market traders will know that the
value of the target company's assets and earning power have been
markedly increased. 7 Therefore, to preserve confidentiality as long
1. Brief for United States at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108
(1980).
2. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 1108 (1980).
3. Brief for United States at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108
(1980).
4. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 1108 (1980).
5. Brief for United States at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108
(1980).
6. A tender offer is a bid by an individual or group (the "tender offeror") to
purchase shares of a corporation commonly at a "premium," a price above the cur
rent market price. See D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 641-52 (1979). The com
pany whose shares are being acquired is called the "target" corporation. Under the
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I) (1976), a tender offeror may acquire up to 5% of
the target's shares before public disclosure is required.
7. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 1108 (1980). Both the district court and the court of appeals recognized that pre
announcement secrecy is essential to the success of a tender offer or takeover. Sud
den trading in the target company's stock might alert that corporation to the tender
offeror's plans for acquisition. Also, if there is a premature announcement of a tender
offer, trading will result in a premature price rise in the target company's stock to
ward the expected premium:
Thus the primary inducement to stockholders-an offer to purchase their
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as possible, and to prevent an anticipatory price rise in the target
company's stock, vital informationS received by Chiarella concern
ing the tender offers was left absent or in code until the night of
the final printing. 9 Chiarella, however, in addition to his skills as a
printer, was a knowledgeable stock trader who spoke with his bro
ker up to fifteen times a daylO and often watched the ticker tape at
his broker's office. 11 He deciphered the code or discerned the
identity of the target companies on five occasions by comparing in
formation in the draft prospectuses 12 with information contained in
stock guides obtained from his broker.13 Disregarding notices
posted throughout the printing house which stated that use of cus
tomers' confidential information for personal gain was illegal,14
Chiarella invested in the target companies' stock for his own and
for his father's accounts. Chiarella remained silent with respect to
his trading activities. He did not disclose his investments to the
target corporations or to the tender offerors from whom the infor
mation was received. 15 Once the tender offers were made public
by the corporations involved, investors bought shares of the target
companies, and the price of Chiarella's stock increased. substan
tially.16 He then quickly sold at a profit, netting more than $30,000
shares at an attractive price above the market-is lost, and the offeror may
be forced to abandon its plans or to raise the offer to a still higher price. The
cost of an offer to purchase hundreds of thousands of shares might prove
prohibitive if the price had to be increased only a few dollars per share.
Brief for United States at 32, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. H08 (1980)
(quoting Proposed Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of
Donald Calvin, Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange)).
8. The encoded or absent information included the names of the tender offerors
and the prospective target companies. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. H08 (1980).
9. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. H08, 1112 (1980).
10. United States v. Chiarella,588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 1108 (1980).
11. Brief for United States at 6, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108
(1980).
12. This information consisted of, for example, the market on which the stock
was traded, the number of outstanding shares, the par values of the stock, and the
high and low bids for the preceding year. Id. at 7.
13. [d.
14. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1369 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 1108 (1980).
15. [d. at 1363.
16. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
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for securities transactions involving five corporate takeover bids 17
over a period of fourteen months.
Alerted by the New York Stock Exchange to the unusual trad
ing,18 the SEC investigated Chiarella's activities. In a consent de
cree in May of 1977, he agreed to forfeit his profits to those who
had sold him the target stock. 19 On the same day, he was dis
missed from his position at Pandick. On January 4, 1978, Chiarella
was indicted on seventeen counts 20 of wilful misuse of material 21
nonpublic information in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities, in violation of the antifraud provisions of section lO(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)22 and rule lOb-5 23
17. Four of the transacuuns were tender offers and one was a merger. United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1108
(1980).
18. Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rules for Printer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1980,
§ D, at 18, col. 1.
19. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 1108 (1980). Consent decrees had been obtained from four other printers be
tween 1974 and 1978. See, e.g., SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 94,767, at 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
20. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U .S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976) [herein
after cited as the 1934 Act] sanctions criminal penalties against any person who wil
fully violates the Act. Chiarella was charged with 17 counts because he had received
17 letters confirming his purchases of shares. It is unlawful under rule IOb-5 to use
the mails to effect the employment of manipulative and deceptive devices in the
trading of securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1979). See note 23 infra.
21. The information concerning the impending tender offers was stipulated to
be material. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
100 S. Ct, 1108 (1980).
22. Section lO(b) of the 1934 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa
cility of any national securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in con
nection with the purchase or sale of any security not so registered, any ma
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Section lO(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1979) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails or of any facil
ity of any national securities exchange,
a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
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promulgated thereunder which prohibit the use of manipulative
and deceptive devices in the trading of securities. In a motion to
dismiss, Chiarella argued unsuccessfully that he was not subject to
the traditional disclose-or-abstain-from-trading rule under rule
lOb-5 and that consequently the indictment did not charge a
crime. 24 In 1978, a jury convicted Chiarella on every count. 25
In United States v. Chiarella,26 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge
Kaufman, affirmed Chiarella's conviction. The court delineated a
broad new test for liability under rule lOb-5 to proscribe nondis
closure in the purchase or sale of a security by subjecting "any
one" with "regular access to market information" to a duty to
disclose or abstain from trading. 27 Recently, however, a six-mem
ber majority of the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit, stating that in nondisclosure cases, a duty to speak,
which was absent in Chiarella's case, must be present to make si
lence fraudulent under section 10(b).
Chiarella v. United States 28 is an opinion having a significant
impact upon public investors, the SEC, and the market profession
als 29 who make up the securities industry. The Supreme Court's
decision clarifies the standard of rule 10b-5 liability for violations
involving the failure to disclose material nonpublic information. At
the same time, Chiarella halts for the moment judicial expansion of
rule 10b-5 by the lower courts. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Powell and strongly criticized in two dissenting opinions, 30
represents the continuation of a trend by the Court to restrict the
reach of the antifraud sections of the securities laws. 31 On the
24. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 1358
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
25. ld.
26. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. n08 (1980).
27. ld. at 1365.
28. 100 S. Ct. ll08 (1980).
29. Market professionals are securities dealers such as specialists, block
positioners, floor traders and arbitrageurs. See Securities Indus. Assoc. memorandum
amicus curiae at 12, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. n08 (1980).
30. Separate dissenting opinions were written by Chief Justice Burger and by
Justice Blackmun, who was joined by Justice Marshall. See text accompanying notes
103-113 infra.
31. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (requiring proof of scienter
in SEC actions to enjoin securities law violations under § 10(b), rule lOb-5 of the 1934
Act and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring proof of scienter as a prerequisite in private actions for
damages under rule 10b-5). See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Dan
iel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (denying the applicability of the securities laws, including
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other hand, the Court expressed an apparent willingness to con
sider an alternative theory of rule lOb-5 liability posited by the
government, namely that Chiarella violated his duty of silence to
his employer and to the tender offerors. 32 The majority on the
Court decided, however, that the government's theory had not
properly been presented to the jury.33 Had the alternative theory
properly been presented, Chiarella's conviction might have been
upheld. The decision, therefore, leaves room for the possible ex
pansion of rule 10b-5 at a later date.
In order to fully comprehend the degree to which the Second
Circuit expanded and the Supreme Court subsequently contracted
the scope of the duty to disclose under rule lOb-5, the original
purpose, language, and evolution of the rule is examined in section
II. In section III, the test delineated by the Second Circuit and
the attendant but unforeseen difficulties of that test are discussed.
The fourth section describes the Supreme Court's response to the
Second Circuit and is followed in section V by an exposition and
discussion of the government's alternative theory of liability. In
section VI, this note concludes with a proposal of a standard for
nondisclosure violations of rule 10b-5 which aims at an interpreta
tion of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws that is more
flexible than the one stated by the Supreme Court, yet is not
overly broad.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF RULE lOb-5

The purpose behind rule lOb-5, adopted almost a decade after
the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)34 and the 1934 Act,35 was to
close a loophole in the otherwise comprehensive sections of the
major securities laws. For the most part, sellers of a corporation's
securities had been left unprotected from manipulative and decep
tive practices on the part of those who bought their shares. 36
§ lO(b) and rule lOb-5, to noncontributory compulsory pension plans); Santa Fe In
dus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 will not
reach mere breaches of fiduciary duty, absent some manipulation or deception); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting private actions for
damages under rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers or sellers of a corporation's securi
ties).
32. See text accompanying notes 118-24 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 125-35 infra.
34. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976) [hereinafter cited as
the 1933 Act].
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
36. Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for De
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1127 (1950). Only § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, out
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The civil liability sections of the 1933 Act, which dealt primar
ily with the issuance of new securities rather than with trading, of
fered remedies only to defrauded buyers. The rules against fraud
in the purchase of securities promulgated under the 1934 Act prior
to rule lOb-5 applied only to misconduct by brokers and dealers. 37
The addition of section 15(c)38 to the 1934 Act39 did grant the first
major protection to victimized sellers of securities. 4o But section
15(c), which prohibited fraud or misrepresentation in the purchase
as well as in the sale of securities, applied only to brokers and
dealers and to transactions which were not effected on a national
exchange. 41 A considerable gap remained, as neither fraud in the
purchase of securities on a national exchange nor fraud by persons
other than broker-dealers was covered. 42 Traders who fell into the
latter category were those in corporate office who purchased shares
in the corporation while in possession of confidential information.
As long as the profits resulting from an increase in the stock's mar
ket price upon public disclosure43 were not realized within six
months,44 members of this group were immune from liability. Rule
lOb-5 was promulgated, therefore, in order to extend a remedy to
aggrieved sellers of a corporation's securities against fraud perpe
trated by buyers, whether individuals or companies, in securities
lawing fraud "in the sale of" securities could have been interpreted to include fraud
by buyers or sellers. It was not, however. Id. at 1127-28.
37. SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942), reprinted in 4 A. BROM
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, App. B, at 295
(1979).
38. Section 15(c) of the 1934 Act states:
(c) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or in
strumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to in
duce the purchase or sale of, any security ... otherwise than on a national
securities exchange, by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraud
ulent device or contrivance. The Commission shall, for purposes of this sub
section, by rules and regulations define such devices or contrivances as are
manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(I) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, § 15,
48 Stat. 895).
39. Buyers and sellers were granted specific remedies for designated types of
unfair conduct under §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18(a) of the 1934 Act, but these sections were
too narrowly drawn to do sellers much benefit. For example, the profits recovered in
an action by a security holder under § 16(b) were returned to the corporation, not to
defrauded buyers or sellers. Comment, supra note 36, at 1128-29.
40. Id. at 1129-30.
41. Id. at 1130.
42. Id.
43. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
44. Trading in such circumstances would result in liability under § 16(b) of the
1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976).

1980)

RULE lOb-5 LIABILITY

105

transactions whether or not they were effected on a national ex
change. 45
Although it was intended to close a loophole, the broad lan
guage of rule lOb-5 effectively allowed wide flexibility in its use
and thrust it to the forefront of securities regulation. The rule 46
prohibits devious schemes, any fraudulent course of business, and
also bans 'misleading partial disclosure of information by "any per
son" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.47 There
is, however, no explicit mention ofa duty to disclose or of"insiders"48
contained within rule lOb-5 or section lO(b). Therefore, difficult
questions arose in cases in which a person buying or selling securi
ties failed to disclose material nonpublic information within his pos
session. The problem in these nondisclosure, or silence, cases was
to delineate the situations which triggered a duty to disclose the
information.
In early opinions, the duty to disclose material nonpublic in
formation was required of a limited category of insiders, tra
ditionally meaning directors, officers, and controlling shareholders
of the issuer corporation. 49 These insiders were obligated to dis
close information received from sources within the corporation
based on a fiduciary duty to the issuer's shareholders. 50 In a prolif
45. SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942), reprinted in 4 A. BROM
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, App. B, at 295
(1979).
46. See note 23 supra.
47. The language of rule 1Ob-5(b) is strikingly similar to that of § 12(2) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Rule 1Ob-5 was, however, modelled after the pro
visions of §§ 17(a)(2) & (3) of the 1933 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) & (3)
(1976). See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
48. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), however,
explicitly limits liability to beneficial owners of more than 10% of any equity secu
rity, directors, or officers.
49. E.g., Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959) (officers, direc
tors); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (majority share
holders); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (officers).
50. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 322, 344-47 (1979). In Brudney's view, this principle of fiduciary responsibil
ity is based on notions of fidelity, efficiency, and equity. Fidelity means that corpo
rate insiders should not be entitled to trade on inside information acquired in the
course of pursuing the shareholders' business. Id. at 344. Efficiency concerns corpo
rate insiders, who "through control of the corporate apparatus," create an impression
or mistaken impression of corporate affairs to outsiders. Imposition of a disclosure re
quirement on corporate insiders is the least costly method to correct information. Id.
at 345. Corporate insiders have a lawful monopoly on access to information. Outsid
ers, through their diligent efforts to uncover investment information may possess
more information, but it is considered unfair and inequitable for corporate insiders to

'
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eration of litigation under rule lOb-5, courts expanded the scope of
the duty of disclosure. 51 The rationale behind broad judicial inter
pretation of the language of the rule was primarily to equalize ac
cess to inside information concerning material corporate activity
between corporate insiders and the uninformed investing public. 52
Restraint on insider trading was consistent with the New Deal re
sponse to the victimization of investors during the 1920's. 53 Re
strictions were thought necessary to eradicate the idea that trading
on the basis of superior knowledge due to greater access to infor
mation was a normal perquisite of corporate office. 54
The scope of those subject to the duty of disclosure was first
expanded in an SEC proceeding, In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 55 In
Cady, Roberts, a broker-dealer in securities, whose partner was a
director of a corporation, sold a large number of shares of the com
pany's stock upon receiving information from the director-partner
that the corporation would shortly reduce the rate of dividends
paid upon the shares. 56 The SEC unanimously held that the
broker-dealer was subject to the same disqualification from trading
as his partner, the employee of the issuer corporation. As Commis
sion Chairman Cary stated, the categories of officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders do not exhaust the classes of persons upon
whom there is a duty to disclose:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements;
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or in
directly, to information intended to be available only for a cor
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing that it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing. 57
trade on the basis of inside information because theirs is an advantage "which can
not be competed away." Id. at 346.
51. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.
1959); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
52. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
53. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITlES
FRAUD § 2.2, at 2:13 (1979).
54. See § 2 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976); § 16 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78p (1976); H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REp. No.
792, 73d Cong., 24· Sess. 9 (1934). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961).
55. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
56. Id. at 909.
57. Id. at 912.
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The Cady, Roberts test was adopted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul
phur Co. (TGS), 58 which cited the access fonnula as "the essence"
of rule lOb-5. 59 The TGS court articulated the duty of disclosure
by stating that anyone in possession of material nonpublic infonna
tion must either disclose it or, if disabled from disclosing it in or
der to protect a corporate confidence, must abstain from trading in
or recommending the securities concerned while such infonnation
remains undisclosed. 60
The key, therefore, to determine which traders had a duty to
disclose was not based merely on the individual's level in the hier
archy of a corporation. The duty was predicated on an individu
al's61 having a position in the issuer corporation, or having a special
relationship to that corporation or its employees, which gave him
access to material non public information emanating from sources
within the issuer. The ambit of this broad duty to disclose ex
tended beyond traditional corporate insiders to include, for exam
ple, outside brokers and dealers of securities trading on the basis of
access to infonnation from within the corporation, either on behalf
of clients or for their own account. 62 Underwriters of a corpora
tion's securities, attorneys, and accountants for the issuer were also
forbidden to personally profit from undisclosed infonnation re
ceived due to their special relationship to the issuer which made
them privy to internal corporate secrets. These "tippees,"63 in re

58. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
59. Id. at 848.
60. Id. Although the duty was phrased in terms of "disclose or abstain" from
trading, abstention would be preferred rather than a premature disclosure of informa
tion. See note 7 supra. Thus the object of the disclose-or-abstain rule may be seen as
an attempt to deny the possessor of a chance to trade on the basis of superior access
to information, rather than as an attempt to inform investors to aid in their invest
ment decisionmaking. Brudney, supra note 50, at 338.
61. Rule lOb-5 explicitly uses the words "any person." See note 23 supra.
62. 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITlES
FRAUD § 12.4, at 273 (1979).
63. Perhaps the earliest use of the term "tippees" is found in III L. Loss, SE
CURITlES REGULATION 1451 (2d ed. 1961). Loss noted, "Whatever duty of disclosure
rule lOb-5 imposes upon officers, directors and controlling persons could be readily
bypassed if the same duty were not held to devolve at least upon members of their
immediate families." ld. at 1450.
Judicial recognition of the Cady, Roberts principle to hold tippees liable under
rule lOb-5 followed in Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Ross, a
member of the family controlling the issuer and two friends were considered to be
not only insiders, although none was an officer, director or employee, but also
tippees. The court defined tippees as "persons given information by insiders in
breach oftrust." ld. at 410.
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ceipt of material nonpublic infonnation directly from sources within
the issuer, were bound by the same obligation to disclose or ab
stain based on the imputation of a fiduciary duty through their in
side source to the issuer's selling shareholders.64 The receipt of in
side infonnation placed the outside tippees in a special relationship
of access to inside corporate information where no relationship pre
viously existed.
As the history of the rule illustrates, the scope of the duty to
disclose under rule lOb-5 underwent a marked broadening after its
inception. The duty to disclose or abstain from trading was con
strued to apply to both insiders and outsider tippees who pur
chased shares on the basis of access to material non public infonna
tion from sources inside the issuer. Yet, until the decision by the
Second Circuit in Chiarella, no one, whether insider or outsider,
had been held liable under rule lOb-5 for trading on the basis of
access to infonnation received from a source outside the issuer cor
poration. Chiarella, however, did not fall under the scope of disclo
sure delineated by the Second Circuit in TGS. He did not have
access to material nonpublic infonnation through a special rela
tionship to the issuer corporation. Chiarella was an outsider with
access to inside infonnation of the tender offerors by virtue of his
special relationship as printer to those corporations. Using the con
fidential infonnation of the outside source, he purchased securities
of the issuer, target corporations.
To the court of appeals and to the United States Supreme
Court, therefore, Chiarella freely admitted his stock trading activi
ties. 65 He also recognized that those in a position of special rela
tionship to the issuer corporations with access to their material
nonpublic information must refrain from trading as he had or incur
liability under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. Chiarella, however, ar
gued that he was not in any sense an insider of the target corpora
tions. 66 He maintained, therefore, that he owed no fiduciary duty
to the target's shareholders who sold their shares before the tender
offers were announced although they had thereby lost the chance
to profit on the rise in market price of the target's stock.

64.
65.
(quoting
66.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 853.
Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at 1123 (Burger, C.
the trial record at 474,496 & 711).
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364.
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THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S EXPANSION OF RULE
lOb-5 LIABILITY

The majority on the United' States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit disagreed with Chiarella's position, holding that it
was irrelevant whether or not Chiarella was an insider of the
companies whose securities he traded. 67 Citing Chiarella's strategic
place in the market, the majority wrote that those who occupy
such places should not personally profit from information received
by virtue of their position. 68 The court did not distinguish Chia
rella from corporate insiders of the issuer corporation who purchase
its securities on the basis of access to nonpublic information from
sources inside their corporations. In fact, the Second Circuit major
ity termed Chiarella's access to information a better opportunity
to garner sure profits than that of the "most unscrupulous officer
or director."69
The court established a new class of market insiders, stating
flatly that "anyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly re
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that information
to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to dis
close. "70 The court later noted that its test of "regular access to
market information" should provide a "workable rule,"71 embracing
"those who occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism. "72
Judge Meskill, dissenting on the court of appeals, was alarmed
at the drastic broadening of liability under section lO(b) and rule
lOb-5, particularly within the context of a criminal proceeding. 73
He refuted the majority's extension of section lO(b), citing the tradi
tional test requiring a duty to disclose or abstain from trading, which
was limited to persons with a special relationship to the company
affected by the information. 74 Judge Meskill noted that no case had
been cited by the majority in which criminal or civil liability had
been imposed on anyone other than someone standing in a special
relationship to other traders.75 The underlying reason behind the
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.

at 1365.
(emphasis in original).
at 1365-66 (emphasis added).
at 1365.
at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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court's imposition of a duty to disclose or abstain on one like
Chiarella, who occupied an essential position in the marketplace,
drew a sympathetic response from Judge Meskill. He stressed,
however, the need to resist the temptation to redraft legislation by
reading into it what one would like to see written there. 76
Apart from Judge Meskill's criticism that the broadening of
rule lOb-5 liability found no firm roots in prior law, the Second
Circuit's test also raised the spectre of unforeseen difficulties in its
interpretation, application, and effect on other traders. The court's
dual phrasings of the new test, "anyone's regular receipt of mate
rial nonpublic information" and "regular access to market informa
tion," each contained a subtle difference in emphasis. "Material
nonpublic information" is information which affects not only the
price of a company's stock but the value of a company's assets and
earning power as well. 77 The secret knowledge of officers and di
rectors that land their corporation owns contains commercially val
uable mineral deposits describes the familiar inside information sit
uation of TGS . 78 Market information, on the other hand, refers to
information about events or circumstances which affect the market
for a company's securities, but not its assets or earning power. 79
The undisclosed knowledge of a corporate president that a financial
report is about to be published containing a favorable analysis of
the corporation and a recommendation to buy the stock depicts a
situation involving market information. 80
Material nonpublic information has formed the basis for rule
lOb-5 violations since it is information generated from sources in
side a corporation relating directly to that corporation or its activi
ties. Market information, on the other hand, usually emanates from
outside the corporation. 81 Because it concerns any information
which may affect the market for a company's stock, situations
involving market information occur with great frequency. 82
The Securities Industry Association (Association), in a memo
randum amicus curiae filed with the United States Supreme Court,
76. Id. at 1377.
77. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, All IllitialIllquiry into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 798 (1973).
78. Id. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 833.
79. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 77, at 799.
80. Id.
81. Securities Indus. Assoc. memorandum amicus curiae at 4, Chiarella v.
United States, 100 S. Ct. at n08.
82. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 77, at 799.

1980)

RULE lOb-5 LIABILITY

111

criticized both the Second Circuit's emphasis on liability predicated
on abuses of "market information" and on "anyone's regular re
ceipt" of that information. 83 The Association asserted that the test
of the court of appeals constituted an overly broad extension of rule
lOb-5 liability which would adversely affect the trading activities of
securities dealers such as specialists, block positioners, and floor
traders.84 The Association contended that both the SEC and Con
gress had noted that these market professionals perform neces
sary85 functions in the securities marketplace by "risking their capi
tal to abswb imbalances in supply and demand and by helping to
increase the depth, liquidity, and orderliness of trading markets,"
all of which enable investors to make trading decisions with ease
and confidence. 86 Due to their central position in the securities
marketplace, market professionals routinely engage in transactions
while in regular receipt of valuable information which may, in
many instances, be material, nonpublic market information. 87
The implication of the Second Circuit's test was that the mere
status of a person as a market insider may have been sufficient to
trigger a duty to disclose or to abstain from trading. The decision
therefore suggested that market professionals would have been au
tomatically disabled from their normal trading activities by the
threat of liability under rule lOb-5. 88
Although there is considerable debate concerning the extent to
which market professionals should be allowed to exploit informa
tional advantages,89 the Association argued that the activities of
market professionals were already extensively regulated by other
provisions of the securities laws. 90 Furthermore, securities dealers
83. Securities Indus. Assoc. memorandum amicus curiae at 4-5, Chiarella v.
United States, 100 S. Ct. at 1108 (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 11-12 & n.lo
85. Id. at 13 (quoting SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 3902 (1973)).
~
86. [d.
87. [d. at 13. The information may relate, for example, to the
(i) volume and type of order flow in a particular security; (ii) existing bids
and offers on a specialist's "book"; (iii) inventory of a block positioner, par
ticularly blocks of stock that are to be "liquidated" or "laid off"; (iv) posi
tions of arbitrageurs and risk arbitrageurs; and (v) institutional interest in the
purchase or sale of blocks of stock.
[d. (footnote omitted).
88. [d. at 14.
89. Brudney, supra note 50, at 363-64.
90. See, e.g., §§ ll(a) and ll(b) of the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78k
(1976). As originally enacted, § ll(a) empowered the SEC to regulate trading of stock
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were already subject to rule lOb-5 liability under the narrower cir
cumstances of the TGS standard, namely when trading on the basis
of a special relationship giving access to material nonpublic infor
mation from inside the issuer. 91
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD OF RULE
lOb-5 LIABILITY

The Supreme Court's opinion, which reversed Chiarella's con
viction, reflected a recognition of the criticisms raised by both
Judge Meskill and the memorandum amicus curiae. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, first reviewed the language and legislative
history of section lO(b) and decided that neither stated whether the
failure to inform sellers of target company securities constituted a
manipulative or deceptive device. 92 The Court then cited the
Cady, . Roberts formulation of the disclose-or-abstain obligation. 93
Like Judge Meskill, however, Justice Powell emphasized that the
duty to disclose arises from the existence of a relationship of trust
and confidence. 94 Identifying the need to find such a relationship
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who
have obtained confidential information "by reason of their position
with that corporation"95 differs from finding a relationship to the is
suer which allows access to information. Thus, while the Court, in
passing, acknowledged the landmark TGS decision of the Second
Circuit, recognition was premised on the violation of section lO(b)
by corporate insiders using undisclosed information for their own
exchange members for their own account. As amended in 1975, § 11(a) expanded the
potential prohibition on exchange members trading for their own accounts. Congress,
however, exempted certain transactions, including those by specialists, block
positioners and others. Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6(2), 89 Stat. 110
(1975). The transactions were "deemed either to be beneficial to the markets or not
to pose so great a danger to the fair and orderly functioning of the markets...." S.
REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29 id.
Section ll(b) prohibits specialists from revealing information with respect to or
ders placed with them, although they are permitted to trade for their own accounts.
15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1976).
91. See 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI_TIES
FRAUD § 12.4, at 273 (1967): "Many people think of lOb-5 as an insider regulation,
with good reason. No one, except perhaps the broker-dealer, has been hit by it so
hard or so often as corporate insiders trading in their own shares" (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
92. 100 S. Ct. at 1113.
93. Id. at 1114.
94. [d.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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benefit; no mention was made of the rGS statement that access is
the essence of the rule. 96
To uphold Chiarella's conviction under the Second Circuit's
test would, according to the majority, result in the recognition of a
general duty between all participants in market transactions based
on material nonpublic information, a radical departure from ex
isting law. 97 The Court stressed, however, that "a duty to disclose
under section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of non
public market information. "98
The majority's opinion termed the reasoning of the Second
Circuit's test "defective" because the element required to make si
lence fraudulent under rule 1Ob-5, a duty to disclose, was absent
in Chiarella's case. 99 No duty could arise from Chiarella's relation
ship with the sellers of the target companies' securities since he
had had no prior dealings with them: "He was not their agent, he
was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions. "100
The Court· also noted that Chiarella was convicted of violating
section 1O(b) although he had received no confidential information
from the target companies, only market information concerning the
plans of the acquiring companies. 10l Echoing the argument of the
memorandum amicus curiae, the Court pointed out that abuses of
market information "have been addressed by detailed and sophisti
cated regulation that recognizes when use of market information
may not harm operation of the securities markets. "102
Emphasis placed by the majority on the need to find a special
relationship between traders, rather than on a relationship giving
access to information triggering the disclose-or-abstain rule, met
with considerable resistance from Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, each of whom wrote dissenting opinion. loa Both Jus
tices were quick to point to the broad language of section 1O(b) and

a

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

Id. at 1115. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1116-17.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1117.
Justice Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion.
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rule lOb-5, referring as they do to fraudulent activity by "any per
son."104 As Chief Justice Burger remarked, the inclusion in the
statute and the rule of the language referring to "any person"
plainly negates the majority's suggestion that congressional concern
was limited to trading by corporate insiders or to deceptive prac
tices related to corporate information. lOS
Additionally, the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun regarded the Cady, Roberts test as imposing
a duty to disclose based on two factors: (1) Access to information
intended to be available for a corporate purpose and not merely
the presence of a common law fiduciary duty; and (2) the inherent
unfairness of trading on such information when it is inaccessible to
other traders. lOG Chief Justice Burger's opinion stressed that both
factors are present whenever a trader like Chiarella gains an infor
mational advantage by unlawful means. 107 The solution proposed
by the Chief Justice would have been to hold Chiarella liable un
der the principle that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
abstain from trading. 108
Justice Blackmun was willing to go further and found no need
to base Chiarella's conviction on a misappropriation theory. Ac
cording to Justice Blackmun, Chiarella would have been liable
"even if he had obtained the blessing of his employer's principals
before embarking on his profiteering scheme."109 Justice Blackmun
regarded Chiarella's conduct as lying "close to the heart of what
the securities laws are intended to prohibit. "110 The trend in deci
sions by the Court to narrow the scope of section lO(b) and rule
lOb-5, according to Justice Blackmun, has transformed section
lO(b) from an elastic catch-all provision to one which catches "rela
tively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment
in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated in
vestor. "111 While Justice Blackmun could not wholeheartedly sup
104.
senting).
(1972).
105.
!06.
senting).
107.
108.
109.
to whom

Id. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 1126 (Blackmun, J., dis
See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
100 S. Ct. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at. 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 1125 (Blackmun, J., dis

Id. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. See also text accompanying notes 140-49 infra.
100 S. Ct. at 1123 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The "employer's principals"
Justice Blackmun refers are the tender offeror corporations.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1123-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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port the market insider test of the court of appeals, he proposed
his own test. In order to reject tolerance of manipulative and de
ceitful behavior, Justice Blackmun would have prohibited all per
sons having access to confidential material information which was
not legally available to others from engaging in schemes to exploit
their structural informational advantage through trading in affected
securities. 112
The majority openly rejected Justice Blackmun's standard for
liability as not substantially different from that of the court of ap
peals. 113 Such a view, according to the majority opinion, disregards
the necessity to find a special relationship between traders which
triggers the obligation to disclose or abstain from trading. 114
The majority's need to hinge a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading on those in a special relationship to other traders clarifies
the substance of nondisclosure violations under rule lOb-5. Clearly,
insiders trading on the basis of corporate information from sources
inside the issuer are subject to the disclose-or-abstain rule and the
watchful eye of the SEC.
On the other hand, the liability of tippees 115 in light of the
Chiarella opinion is not as clear. The Court stated that tippees of
corporate insiders had been held liable under section lO(b) because
of their duty not to profit from the use of confidential information.
The tippee's obligation, the Court noted, has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty.116 As Justice Blackmun pointed out, the
Court failed to state explicitly whether "the obligations of a special
relationship must fall directly upon the person engaging in an al
legedly fraudulent transaction or whether the derivative obligations
of 'tippees' that lower courts have long recognized, are encom
passed by its rule."117 Because of the apparent ambiguity in the
majority's opinion, the conduct of tippees trading through corpo
rate insiders on the basis of their inside information may prove a
new, fertile ground of litigation.
The possibility of liability for nondisclosure under rule lOb-5
for outsiders, such as Chiarella trading on the basis of information
from sources outside the issuer, has been sharply curtailed by the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1126 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1118 n.20.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 63 & 64 supra.
100 S. Ct. at 1115-16 n.12.
Id. at 1124 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority's decision absent the showing of prior dealings between
the trader and sellers of the issuer's securities. The Court, how
ever, did express a willingness to extend rule lOb-5 liability under
an alternative theory advanced by the government. 118 Indeed, a
majority of the Court might have affirmed Chiarella's conviction on
these grounds, had the theory clearly been presented to the jury at
Chiarella's trial. 119

v.

THE GOVERNMENT'S TEST

The government, taking a surprising position, did not request
that Chiarella's conviction be affirmed on the grounds delineated
by the Second Circuit. In agreement with the contention of the As
sociation, the government asserted in its brief to the Supreme
Court "that certain language in the opinion of the court of appeals
. . . incorrectly suggests that mere possession or regular receipt of
confidential market information precludes market professionals . . .
from carrying on their normal business activities. "120 The govern
ment, however, stressed that this interpretation by the Association
was founded on language read out of context. 121 Concerned, never
theless, by the Association's criticism of the Second Circuit's test,
the Justice Department requested affirmation of Chiarella's convic
tion by the Supreme Court upon different grounds.
The government's alternative theory was aimed at avoiding the
adoption of a single test to govern nondisclosure violations under
rule lOb-5. The Justice Department contended that Chiarella's use
of the information from the tender offeror amounted to secret con
version of confidential information for purely personal profit. 122
Borrowing language used by the district court, the government ar~
gued that the conversion of material information was akin to em
bezzlement123 by which Chiarella defrauded the corporations that
had entrusted him with the encoded data. This breach of his duty
to the acquiring corporations, the government maintained, prac

U8.
Ug.
120.
U08.
121.
122.
123.
1978)).

See text accompanying notes U9-24 infra.
See text accompanying notes 125-35 infra.
Brief for United States at 70 n.48, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at
Id.
Brieffor United States at 28, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at ll08.
Id. at 16 (citing United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.
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ticed through the purchase and sale of securities, constituted a
scheme to defraud in violation of rule lOb-5 and section 1O(b).124
With regard to the government's contention that Chiarella had
defrauded the tender offerors, the majority decided that the jury,
in this criminal case, had not been instructed on the nature or ele
ments of a duty owed by Chiarella to anyone other than the sellers
of the target's stock. 125 Therefore, the majority declined to decide
whether the government's theory had merit. 126
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, thought the Court's reading
of the trial court's instructions was unduly restrictive. In his opin
ion, reading the charge to the jury as a whole and in the context of
the trial required the jury to find that Chiarella obtained his trad
ing advantage by misappropriating the property of his employer's
customers. Citing the instructions to the jury in the trial record,
Chief Justice Burger noted: "[I]n simple terms, the charge is that
Chiarella wrongfully took advantage of information he acquired in
the course of his confidential position at Pandick Press. "127
Justice Brennan agreed with the Chief Justice's analysis of the
substantive law, that a "person violates section lO(b) whenever he
improperly obtains or convt:)rts to his own benefit nonpublic infor
124. Brief for United States at 28, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at
1108. In cases such as Chiarella, there exists the possibility of liability under prin
ciples of common law established in decisions such as Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,
31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949), even in the absence of liability under rule 10b-5.
In Brophy, the "confidential secretary" to a director of Cities Service Co. bought and
sold securities at a profit because he had learned in advance when the corporation
would buy large blocks of its own stock. The court held the corporate secretary lia
ble to Cities Service Co. as a constructive trustee for all profits the employee real
ized by virtue of having acquired nonpublic information relating to his employer's
business.
A significant factor in the Brophy court's opinion was that Cities Service Co. had
entered the market as an actual purchaser of securities. This factor is also present in
Chiarella, as the tender offerors were purchaser of the target companies' stock.
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, Chiarella's attorney, Stanley Arkin,
argued that sanctions other than those imposed by rule lOb-5 would have been more
appropriate ways to have dealt with Chiarella's conduct. [1979] SEC. .REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 527, at A-2. He noted that his client had been dismissed by his employer
for breaking the printing company rules against the use of confidential information.
He also suggested that state court suits for breach of contract or unlawful conversion
of corporate opportunity might have been used against Chiarella instead of the fed
eral securities laws. Attorney Arkin did acknowledge that there was no criminal pen
alty against Chiarella's conduct under New York law, where the action arose, al
though other states do prohibit forms of industrial espionage. ld.
125. 100 S. Ct. at 1118.
126. Id. at 1119.
127. Id. at 1122 (Burger, C.]., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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mation which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. "128 Justice Brennan, however, was unable to find an
instruction to the jury suggesting that one element of Chiarella's
offense was the improper conversion of nonpublic information. Ac
cordingly, rather than joining the Chief Justice's dissent, Justice
Brennan concurred in the opinion of the majority.
Justice Stevens also concurred in the majority's opinion strictly
on the grounds outlined by Justice Powell. 129 Justice Stevens
agreed that civil or criminal violations of rule lOb-5 necessitate the
identification of the duty the defendant has breached. Justice Ste
vens agreed, too, that the Court correctly decided not to address
the question of whether Chiarella's breach of his duty of silence to
his employer and the tender offerors could give rise to criminal lia
bility under rule lOb_5. 130 He indicated, however, the problems
which the government will face when it next attempts to prove lia
bility under its theory. It could be argued that Chiarella's breach of
a duty to the acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential
information constituted "a fraud or a deceit upon those companies
'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' "131 On
the other hand, Justice Stevens pointed out that "inasmuch as
those companies would not be able to recover damages from peti
tioner for violating rule lOb-5 because they were neither purchas
ers nor sellers of target company securities, "132 it could be argued
that no actionable violation of rule lOb-5 had occurred. 133
With Justice Stevens willing to entertain arguments on the
government's theory and four other Justices willing to go at least as
128.
129.

Id. at ll20 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at lll9 (Stevens, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 113 &

114 supra.
130. Id. at ll19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. ld. (citing Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir.), cen. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1973)). Justice Stevens noted that the specific hold
ing of Eason had been rejected in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U:S.
723 (1975). He then commented, "However, the limitation on the right to recover pe
cuniary damages in a private action identified in Blue Chip is not necessarily coex
tensive with the limits of the rule itself." 100 S. Ct. at 1119n.*.
132. ld. at ll19-20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), only pri
vate actions for damages were limited under rule 10b-5, however. The Court held
that standing to bring a private civil suit is restricted to actual purchasers or sellers
of securities. Therefore, the fact that the tender offerors were neither purchasers nor
sellers of the target companies' securities would prevent a private action under the
rule and the subsequent recovery of damages. Contrary to Justice Stevens' assess
ment, however, the actual purchaser or seller requirement would not preclude an ac
tionable violation of rule 1Ob-5 in a suit initiated by the SEC.

1980]

RULE lOb-5 UABIUTY

119

far as upholding a misappropriation theory,l34 the possibility exists
that Chiarella's conviction would have been upheld had the theory
of liability clearly been presented to the jury.135 Yet the majority
decided it had not. Acceptance of the government's theory, there-'
fore, has yet to be confirmed. Until such a determination is made,
the limitation of liability' under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 to the
standard accepted by the majority's decision could lead to anoma
lous results. For example, if a printer such as Chiarella were to
convert nonpublic information acquired from a tender offeror, he
could remain silent and purchase securities of the target corpora
tion. He would be obtaining information from an outside source.
Consequently, he would have no relationship to the sellers of the
target company's stock for he would be "a complete stranger who
dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transac
tions. "136 On the other hand, if the printer were to obtain material
nonpublic information from merger documents submitted by a tar
get corporation, he would be prohibited from trading without dis
closure under the Chiarella decision as long as he were considered
the agent of the target company's selling shareholders or one with
whom they had had prior dealings. 137 If not, he too would be free
to trade without disclosure. By upholding the government's theory,
the Supreme Court could eliminate the possibility that the printer
would be free to trade in either situation. Liability would be prem
ised on the misappropriation of information from the target and
tender offeror corporations employing the printing firm.
Still, nondisclosure violations under rule lOb-5 would then be
subject to two standards. Liability for corporate insiders and, sub
ject to clarification, their tippees, would be based on a fiduciary or
pre-existing relationship to the selling shareholders of the corpora
tion's stock. Liability for an outsider- obtaining information from an
outside source would be predicated upon finding the breach of an
employee's duty through the misappropriation of information. A
more uniform test under rule lOb-5 is preferable.
In addition, the majority's view of rule lOb-5, although it is a
good base from which to start, restricts the standard of liability to
134. The Justices suggesting a willingness to uphold the government's theory
are: Burger, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall.
135. The United States Attorney's office in New York is considering whether to
prosecute Chiarella under the government's theory. Wall St. J., March 19, 1980, at
12, col. 3.
136. 100 S. Ct. at 1117.
137. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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its earliest beginnings. By doing so, the opinion unduly hampers
the SEC in the agency's ability to deter and punish those who em
ploy new manipulative and cunning devices in securities transac
tions. 13S
The majority opinion did hint that rule making by the SEC
evidenced by congressional intent could be the method by
which fraudulent conduct resting on a "'somewhat different
theory' than that previously used to regulate insider trading un
der section lO(b)" may be reached. 139 No such judicial reliance on
138. The meager legislative history of § lO(b) indicates that its purpose was in
tended to be expansive. In the first version of the Bill, § 9(c) was summarized by one
who helped draft the provision, Thomas G. Corcoran:
Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.'
... Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative de
vices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative de
vices.
Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), re
printed in 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LoWENFELS, SECUmTIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 2.2, at 2:23 n.(332) (1979).
139. 100 S. Ct. at 1117-18. In fact, the SEC recently adopted rule 14e-3, which
provides:
§ 240. 14e-3--Transactions in securities on the basis of material, non
public information in the context of tender offers.
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the mean
ing of section 14( e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession
of material information relating to such tender offer which information
he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or
has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from (1) the
offering person, (2) the issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by
such tender offer, or (3) any. officer, director, partner or employee or
any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer,
to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securi
ties or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such se
curities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the fore
going securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase
or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press
release or otherwise.
(b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of
this section if such person shows that:
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of
such person to purchase or sell any security described in paragraph
(a) or to cause any such security to be purchased or sold by or on
behalf of others did not know the material, nonpublic information;
and
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies
and procedures, reasonable under the circumstances, taking into
consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that in
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rulemaking to cover nondisclosure cases is necessary, however, in
light of the prior expansion of the rule. Nothing in the language,
evolution, or history of the rule required the Court's narrow read
ing of section lO(b) and rule lOb-S. 140
dividual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate para
graph (a), which policies and procedures may include, but are not
limited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and causing
any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those which pre
vent such individual(s) from knowing such information.
(c) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (a) to the contrary, the following
transactions shall not be violations of paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Purchase(s) of any security described in paragraph (a) by a broker
or by another agent on behalf of an offering person; or
(2) Sale(s) by any person of any security described in paragraph (a) to
the offering person.
(d) (1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive
or manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of section
14(e) of the Act, it shall be unlawful for any person described in
paragraph (d)(2) of this section to communicate material, nonpublic
information relating to a tender offer to any other person under cir
cumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such commu
nication is likely to result in a violation of this section except that
this paragraph shall not apply to a communication made in good
faith,
(i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offer
ing person, to its advisors or to other persons, involved in the
planning, financing, preparation or execution of such tender
offer;
(ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be be sought
by such tender offer, to its officers, directors, partners, em
ployees or advisors or to other persons, involved in the
planning, financing, preparation or execution of the activities
of the issuer with respect to such tender offer; or
(iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule
or regulation promulgated thereunder.
(d) (2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d)(I) of this section are:
(i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employ
ees or advisors;
(ii) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such
tender offer or its officers, directors, partners, employees or
advisors;
(iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d)(2)(i)
or the issuer or persons in paragraph (d)(2)(ii); and
(iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to a
tender offer which information he knows or has reason to
know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know
has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of the above.
SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-17, 120 (Sept. 4, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410
(1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3).
The rule will cover activities by printers such as Chiarella, who are in posses
sion of material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. See 45 Fed. Reg.
60,410,60,411-13 (1980).
140. See text accompanying notes 34-65 supra.
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TEST

The test now proposed would be based firmly on that deline
ated by the Supreme Court majority in Chiarella with respect to
corporate insiders but would incorporate a more liberal interpreta
tion of rule lOb-5 to broaden liability to include instances when in
formation is obtained from a source outside the issuer corporation.
An interpretation of rule lOb-5 and the test of access under Cady,
Roberts and TGS which is more flexible than the one the Supreme
Court majority was willing to accept in Chiarella is warranted in
order to promote both the equalization of access to information as a
matter of public policy and fair dealing. 141 Even a modified expan
sion of the duty to disclose, however, should not be as broad as the
tests of the Second Circuit and Justice Blackmun. Rather, it should
be flexible enough to encourage the private pursuit of market infor
mation and narrow enough to insure that neither all outside invest
ors nor market professionals trading in the ordinary course of busi
ness are trapped in the net of rule lOb-5. This test would
encompass the activities of one like Chiarella but give clear guid
ance to future rule lOb-5 litigants as well.

A.

Materiality

The first step in determining liability for nondisclosure viola
tions would be to overcome the threshold question of material
ity.l42 It should not make a difference whether the information will
have a long-term impact on a company's earning power or assets or
a short-term impact on the stock's market price. 143 Nor should it
make a difference if the information is generated from within or
without the issuer corporation. As long as the nonpublic informa
141. It is possible that the Court may have been willing to consider an expan
sion liability under rule lOb-5 had this been a civil and not a criminal case. See note
31 supra, discussing the trend in Supreme Court decisions to narrow interpretation
of the rule and section 10(b).
142. The test for materiality is based on an objective standard. In SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849, the court determined that whether a fact were to
be deemed material would depend on whether a reasonable man would attach im
portance to the information in determining his action. In a more recent case, how
ever, the United States Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1975), held that the materiality of a particular fact depended on the "sub
stantial likelihood" that it would assume actual significance in the investor's mind or
would significantly alter the total mix of infonnation as he viewed it. The Court was
concerned that too Iowa threshold of materiality would lead corporate management,
concerned about liability, to inundate the investor with trivial information, a result
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking. Id.
143. See 100 S. Ct. at 1121 n.1 (Burger, C.]., dissenting).
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tion is considered material and is deemed to have a substantial im
pact on the reasonable investor, there is an inherent problem of
trading on the basis of unequal and therefore unfair access to infor
mation. 144 In Chiarella's case, the information concerning impend
ing tender offers on which he traded was stipulated to be mate
rial. 145 While this threshold standard would apply to market
professionals with access to material nonpublic market information,
liability would still not be incurred unless it was determined that
they were subject to a disqualification from trading.

B.

The Obligation to Disclose or Abstain from Trading
1.

Receipt of Information from a Source Inside the Issuer

If the information is considered material, the next step would
be to determine if the person involved has a duty to disclose or ab
stain from trading. Consistent with the majority's opinion, if a
trader is in a position of special relationship to the issuer's share
holders with access to the issuer's inside confidential information at
one time or as often as he chooses, there would be a duty to dis
close or abstain from trading. This duty would be based on a fidu
ciary obligation to the shareholders of the corporation's stock who
sold during the period the information remained undisclosed;
2.

Receipt of Information from a Source Outside the Issuer

The new proposals in this test, however, would impose a duty to
disclose or abstain on certain insiders and outsiders with access to
material nonpublic information from sources outside the issuer. Li
ability for a corporate insider of the issuer receiving information
from outside would also be based on a fiduciary duty to the corpo
ration's shareholders. For example, the president of a corporation
who heard from an outside financial analyst that the latter was
about to publish a report favorable to the corporation 146 would be
in possession of information likely to have an impact on the price of
the company's stock. 147 A duty to disclose or abstain from trading
in such circumstances would be consistent with the long-standing

144. See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289
(1965).
145. See note 21 supra.
146. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
147. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 77, at 798-99.
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rationale behind rule lOb-5 which has been to deny trading advan
tages by those in a position of superior access to information. 148
One large category of potentially liable investors remains to be
discussed. This category comprises traders with no relationship or
fiduciary duty to the issuer corporation or its shareholders who re
ceive material nonpublic information concerning the issuer from an
outside source. Chiarella, market professionals, and a plethora of
other traders would fall into this category. In order to prevent the
test for liability from being considered overly broad, a duty to dis
close should be imposed only after an examination of two factors.
The means by which the trader acquired the material
nonpublic information should be the first factor to be considered.
In Chiarella's case, he did not simply overhear the information in
an elevator or a restaurant. Policing situations in which outsiders
trade on the basis of information acquired through eavesdropping
would be administratively difficult. Nor did Chiarella simply ac
quire the information through legitimate business operations. It
was necessary for him to decode the information entrusted to his
care before he could trade. A market professional, on the other
hand, who acquired material information from a source outside the
issuer while pursuing legitimate business operations, would not
have violated the rule. If, however, he received a tip from a
printer and realized he was obtaining converted information, sub
sequent trading on the basis of that information would violate sec
tion 1O(b) and rule lOb_5. 149
The second factor to consider would be the trader's utilization
of the information once it had been acquired. If the information is
used to further day-to-day trading activities, no violation of rule
lOb-5 would result. 150 On the other hand, the deliberate use of
such information for purely personal gain would result in liability.
Chiarella, for example, deliberately misappropriated the confiden
tial information he received solely to reap personal profit. A market
professional would also incur liability were he to do the same. Such
a use would not be in furtherance of his function in the securities
marketplace. Another example of a trader who could incur liability
would be the president of a corporation who knew of the decision
by his company to acquire a target company's stock. Under the Su
148. Brudney, supra note 50, at 326.
149. Brief for United States at 70-71 n,48, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
at 1108.
150. See Comment, The Application of Rule lOb-5 to "Market Insiders":
United States v. Chiarella, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1538, 1547 (1979).
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preme Court majority's standard for liability in silence cases, he
would not incur liability as no relationship between himself and the
target's shareholders would exist. Under the test now proposed,
however, the deliberate use of this information acquired through
confidential dealings and for purely personal profit would place him
under a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The language and legislative history of rule lOb-5 and section
lO(b) do not mention liability for failure to disclose material
nonpublic information. Liberal judicial interpretation, however,
imposed a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on corporate
insiders and outsider tippees with access to inside information.
Consistent with the historical expansion of liability under rule
lOb-5, the court of appeals attempted to delineate a new test which
would encompass the activities of a printer outside the issuer cor
poration with access to information from an outside source. The
test, though, was subject to criticism and unforeseen problems in
application to an overly broad segment of market traders. In a de
cision narrowing the scope of the duty to disclose to a standard
based on the identification of a special relationship to the issuer's
shareholders, the majority of the Supreme Court in Chiarella re
futed the test of the court of appeals. In its place, the government
posited an alternative theory of rule lOb-5 liability. The govern
ment maintained that Chiarella's misuse of nonpublic information
violated a duty of silence owed to his employer and to the tender
offerors. The Supreme Court's willingness to consider the govern
ment's misappropriation theory, when properly presented to the
jury, leaves the door open to limited expansion in the future. Ac
ceptance by the Court of the government's theory could result in
the application of a dual standard of liability, however, depending
upon whether a duty to the issuer's shareholders or to an employer
has been violated. A more uniform test is now proposed. Narrower
and more definitive than the tests offered by the Second Circuit
and the dissent of Justice Blackmun, this test delineates a method
of factual assessment based upon whether material nonpublic infor
mation is received from a source inside or outside the issuer. If in
formation is received from an inside source, the disclosure of such
information or an abstention from trading would be warranted
based upon a fiduciary duty or special relationship to the issuer's
shareholders. Trading on the basis of receipt of information from an
outside source would be carefully scrutinized. Corporate insiders
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would be subject to a disqualification from trading also based upon
the existence of a fiduciary duty. Liability for outsiders trading on
information received from an outside source would be incurred
only after an examination of two factors, the means by which the
information was acquired and the subsequent utilization of that in
formation. Consequently, the test now proposed would allow a nar
row but flexible determination of the future outsiders who would
incur a duty to disclose or abstain from trading in a corporation's
securities.

Lynda Godkin

